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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INTERIM RESEARCH AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
Research and Analysis Branch

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JAPANESE WAR PRODUCTION INDUSTRIES

Part IV

The Shipbuilding Industry

Description

Discussion of the Japanese shipbuilding industry; corporate structure and the history of governmental control receive the major emphasis. The capacity and technological aspects of this industry are also discussed.

31 October 1945

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By the middle of 1944, Japan's losses of merchant and naval vessels had so reduced the number of oceangoing ships that she was unable to find the transport required both to supply military forces committed in various areas and to move the volume of raw materials necessary to maintain 1943 levels of industrial output. In order to make ship construction equal losses, Japan would have had to build merchant vessels at the rate of at least 2,500,000 gross tons in 1944.

Latest figures as revealed by the Japanese Diet (5 September 1945) indicate that the nation had no more than 200,000 odd gross tons of operable

merchant tonnage (over 100 tons) left at the cessation of hostilities.^{1/}

Exact figures for wartime naval building and losses are given in Table 10.

* * * * *

P. Organization of the Shipbuilding Industry

1. Brief History and Economic Considerations.

a. Review to 1932. In addition to considering the specific questions of security and convertibility in the Japanese shipbuilding industry, it is necessary that we review historically and briefly the economic aspects of the shipbuilding industry in Japan with a view to determining to what extent the industry has been expanded along uneconomic lines.

Ever since the Restoration of 1868, the Japanese Government has paid close attention to shipping problems, and soon after the war of 1895 in China, it embarked on a program of subsidies governed by laws enacted in 1896. The abnormal boom conditions prevailing during World War I, when (in 1919) 612,000 gross tons of merchant ships were launched, diminished the need for subsidies, but soon afterwards the annual amount of operating subsidies tended to revert to dimensions of 1914.

During the 1920's the shipbuilding industry entered a long period of depression. Merchant ship construction dropped to a low of 42,000 gross tons in 1927, and operating subsidies amounted to about ten million yen a year. During this period, the Government did not give direct shipbuilding subsidies, but assisted shipbuilders by means of bounties on domestic steel production and certain exemptions from import duties. In 1929 the Government framed a program for the assistance of shipping in the form of loans on easy terms for shipbuilding. A loan fund of thirty million yen was made available,

^{1/}

This figure may be a little on the low side to gain Allied sympathy and aid for their economic reconstruction. For example, their total does not include tonnage of ships in repair which exceeds operable tonnage.

but owing to the world economic depression which followed, little use was made of this facility. A slow increase then began; the rate of increase was greatly accelerated in the early 30's by a government subsidized program of merchant ship construction. Under government direction Japanese lines acquired fast cargo ships which were the equal of any in their class in the world.

b. Scrap and Build Schemes; Shipbuilding During the 1930's. In 1932, the Japanese Government made an important decision when, with a view to improving the unfavorable age distribution of the Japanese Merchant Marine and to reducing the frequency of marine casualties, it introduced the first of three "Scrap and Build" Schemes. The first scheme, which took effect as of 1 October 1932, provided for the construction of 200,000 gross tons of new shipping, on condition that two tons of vessels of twenty-five years and over were scrapped for each ton of new vessels built under subsidy. Each new vessel had to be 4,000 gross tons or over, capable of at least thirteen and one-half knots speed, and built in a Japanese yard.

The scheme resulted in the scrapping of ninety-four vessels of about 400,000 gross tons and in the building of thirty-one new vessels of about 200,000 gross tons.

It was estimated that the expenditure involved in building the thirty-one ships was a little less than 55,000,000 yen. The total government subsidy was nearly 11,000,000 yen.

The second and third schemes, which took effect in 1935 and 1936 respectively, were on a smaller scale than the first. Their combined result was the scrapping of 100,000 gross tons and the construction of seventeen vessels of about 100,000 gross tons, the rate of subsidy being little more than half that under the first scheme. The vessels built had a gross tonnage of 4,000 tons or more and were capable of over fifteen knots speed.

By the early part of 1937, the three Scrap and Build Schemes had resulted in the scrapping of some 500,000 gross tons of old tonnage and the construction of forty-eight new fast ships of some 300,000 tons gross. These forty-eight included more than four-fifths of the total number of Japanese vessels of over 4,000 gross tons and less than five years old. At that time Japan had more tonnage less than five years old in proportion to her total tonnage than any other country. The following table shows the ships constructed and scrapped in accordance with the three ship improvement plans.

Table 17

Ships Constructed and Scrapped in Accordance with the Three Ship Improvement Plans

Ships Constructed			Ships Dismantled		
<u>Plan</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Total Tonnage</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Total Tonnage</u>	<u>Fiscal Year</u>
First	31	198,989	94	399,122	1931-34
Second	8	49,760	12	52,798	1935-36
Third	9	50,690	13	47,235	1936-37
Total	48	299,439	119	499,155	

Note: It was not possible to ascertain the number of vessels actually dismantled under the third plan.

The cost of the three ship improvement plans totalled ¥ 14,000,000 (¥4,062,800), including ¥ 11,000,000 for the first plan and ¥ 1,500,000 for each of the next two plans.

A fourth scheme came into operation in April 1937 and provided for the subsidized construction of superior passenger and passenger-cargo liners of not less than 6,000 gross tons and nineteen knots speed, at rates of subsidy approximating in some cases half the building cost. In a supplement to the Official Gazette of July 1937, it was stated that the subsidies, though payable by installments spread over eighteen years, would be paid during the next four years for the construction of 150,000 gross tons of passenger vessels and 150,000 gross tons of passenger-cargo vessels. It was proposed to spend a total of over fifty million yen on this scheme during the eighteen years beginning with 1937-38.

* * * * *

Table 18 gives the total launchings of vessels of 100 gross tons and upwards for selected years between 1913 and 1938:

Table 18

Total Launchings of Merchant Vessels (in tons)

Date	Number	Tonnage
1913	152	64,664
1920	140	456,642
1930	37	151,272
1932	44	54,422
1934	155	152,420
1936	180	294,861
1937	180	451,121
1938	146	441,720

Source: Shipbuilding in Japan, 1940 (Japan Economic Federation).

The trend in the middle thirties was towards the construction of luxury passenger liners for deep-sea service, but was reversed after the outbreak of the war with China. The shipbuilding industry directly reflected the change in shipping needs from large-sized vessels for deep-sea service to small and medium-sized bottoms for coastal trade. Of the total orders placed up to the end of May 1939, 165 cargo vessels accounted for 808,670 tons. Of these, thirty-four vessels larger than the 7,000-ton class amounted to 306,600 tons, while 133 under 6,000 tons totalled 502,070 tons. Compared with the figures for 30 November 1938 or six months earlier, the former class showed a decline of two in number and 27,930 in tonnage, but the latter class gained eighty-five in number and 325,420 in tonnage.

Table 19 shows the ships launched by 1,000 ton classes between 1932 and 1938. Little change in emphasis is visible here.

Table 19

Class	No. of in Ships	No. of Ships 1932	No. of Ships 1934	No. of Ships 1936	No. of Ships 1937	No. of Ships 1938
tons	tons	%	tons	%	tons	%
1,000	1	1,500)	1	1,810)	18	25,820)
2,000	4	9,900)60	2	5,200)120	7	19,050)31
3,000	1	3,500)	1	3,000)	9	31,510)
4,000	-	---	2	9,000)	9	38,530)
5,000	-	---	20	---	25	21,500)36
6,000	2	12,000)	3	20,100)	6	39,200)
7,000	-	---	9	66,250)	3	22,150)
8,000	2	16,800	-	---	55	17,550)20
9,000	-	---	2	19,730)	2	18,220)
10,000	-	---	-	---	3	36,800)13
Total	10	43,760	20	124,180	63	270,710
					93	419,665
					77	414,090

Source: Far East Yearbook, 1941.

c. Naval Construction; Comparison with Merchant Vessel Construction.

Naval vessel construction was of course also stressed during this period, as is shown by the following table (Table 20). Merchant ship launchings are also shown in this table and it will be noted that minor variations exist between these figures and those previously given in Table 19. These differences are not significant, but largely reflect different source material. The information below is carried over into 1940.

Table 20

Total Tonnage of Steel Merchant Ships and Naval Vessels Launched
by Yards in Japan and Japanese-Controlled Territory

1934-1940

	Naval Ships (displ. tons)	Merchant Ships (gross tons)
1940	157,510	208,014
1939	118,790	342,880
1938	53,812	438,890
1937	52,258	487,357
1936	53,305	305,803
1935	39,762	145,901 ^a
1934	38,274	154,860 ^a

Source: Glasgow Herald, Annual Trade Review, 1936, 1937, 1938.

Lloyd's Register of Shipping. London, Special tabulation supplied in March, 1943. Jane's Fighting Ships, 1941. Oriental Economist (Tokyo) April, 1936.

^a/ Includes only the output in Japan proper.

2. Government Intervention and Supervision: Laws.

a. Shipbuilding Industry Law.^{1/} The China and European Wars necessitated a large increase in the military shipping of Japan. It was necessary to make up for war losses in shipping as well as for the decreases in neutral and world shipping. For the most part Japan had to rely upon her own power and ability for further shipbuilding.

To cope with this newly arisen situation, Japan enacted several important shipping acts including the Emergency Shipping Control Act, the Shipbuilding Industry Act, and the Shipbuilding Control Act. Of these laws, the most fundamental is the Shipbuilding Industry Act, whose nature and function it will be well to describe in detail. The law has been described by a semi-official Japanese source in this way:

(i) Purpose of the Law. "The purpose of the Law is to increase the supply of vessels at low costs and the maintenance of adequate shipbuilding capacity from the viewpoint of national defense. The Law as passed by the 74th session of the Diet in 1939 provides measures for Government protection and control of the shipbuilding industry."

(ii) Government Supervision. "By this Law, the shipbuilding industry is brought under strict Government supervision. The establishment of new enterprises, amalgamation, and cessation of work of shipbuilding companies are subject to permission from the Government."

(iii) Shipbuilders' Privileges. "Shipbuilders, however, are given the right of eminent domain and are allowed to issue debentures to an amount twice their paid-up capital. The Government may issue instructions as regards the building of hulls, engines, and equipment not yet made in this country, and may grant subsidies in such cases. It may also order shipbuilders to use domestic products in building hulls, engines, and equipment. The Government may set standards for quality and may disqualify products which do not conform to this standard."

^{1/} Passed by the 74th session of the Diet in 1939.

(iv) Government Subsidy and Indemnity. "The Government may, if necessary for the promotion of the shipbuilding industry, grant subsidies to either shipbuilders or shipowners. The Government may, in the public interest, order shipbuilders to effect changes in prices for vessels, hulls, engines, and equipment, as well as in repair costs, etc. The Government may also, when deemed necessary in the public interest, demand the installation, enlargement, and improvement of equipment, the repair of vessels, hulls, engines, and equipment, and the establishment of facilities for research on specified subjects. The Government may indemnify shipbuilders for any losses incurred by shipbuilders in the execution of these orders.

(v) The Right to Organize Compulsory Cartels. "The Law also contains provision for cooperative associations which may be organized by shipbuilders for collective purchasing, administration of materials, establishment of facilities for common use, control of business activities of members, and research work for the common benefit. The Government may order members of these associations to comply with regulations and may instruct outsiders to join the organizations. Finally, the Government may instruct such organizations to undertake certain activities for the healthful development of the industry."

b. Fundamental Shipbuilding Regulations. While thus strengthening the control over shipping and shipbuilding on the one hand, Japan adopted six measures in 1939 describing the standard for cargo vessels in order to encourage construction of these vessels on the other. Out of this a new national shipping policy grew up, under which a number of plans were put into execution.

But as an aftermath of 7 December 1941 a demand for more rapid increase in Japan's shipbuilding arose. To meet the situation, a set of fundamental systematic shipbuilding regulations were adopted and made public in May 1942. These regulations were drawn up on the assumption that shipbuilders were to build, according to government plan and with powerful government assistance, as many ships within a certain period of time as the demand warranted. For the realization of this program, the following technical qualifications were considered essential:

(i) For a determined standard-size ship, certain fixed specifications of the ship's hull, engine equipment, and other parts were to be furnished to the builder along with the necessary drawings. The idea was to help facilitate mass production of ships. It was, in short, to standardize the planning, so that complications would no longer arise as they had in the past when different shipbuilders presented individual ideas, plans, and drawings.

(ii) With regard to the order for a non-standard ship, construction work would not be accepted generally, except in such a special case as the building of a passenger boat.

(iii) In order to obtain the highest degree of efficiency from every individual shipyard, each yard would be assigned the building of a certain class of ship under the standardization plan, and would make the construction of such a type its speciality. There were nineteen classes, all told, running as follows: six classes or grades for cargo vessels, three for oil tankers, one for ore-carrying ships, five for wooden vessels, and four for wooden barges. The classes were divided as follows:

Freighters:

Type A	Total tonnage	6,300 tons
Type B	Total tonnage	4,400 tons
Type C	Total tonnage	2,700 tons
Type D	Total tonnage	1,900 tons
Type E	Total tonnage	830 tons
Type F	Total tonnage	495 tons

Tankers: Total tonnage of 10,000 tons, 5,000 tons and 1,000 tons.

Mineral ore freighters: Total tonnage of 5,500 tons.

The above vessels are made of steel. Vessels of smaller types, due to the lack of steel, are made of wood. They are called standard wartime wooden ships. They may be divided into two kinds:

Wooden freighters: Total tonnage of 250 tons, 200 tons, 150 tons, 100 tons and 70 tons.

Light wooden ships: Loaded tonnage of 300 tons, 200 tons, 150 tons and 100 tons.

c. Other Rationalization Techniques

Aside from the point that individual builders were to come under the standardized shipbuilding scheme, the following points were also stressed:

(i) Standardized specification for steel used in shipbuilding, (ii) development to the utmost of the scope within which substitute materials are used, (iii) simplification of the ship's hull, engine, and equipment, (iv) expansion of the scope within which electric welding is applied, and (v) general saving of materials by improving shipbuilding technique.

3. Administration

a. The Navy Ministry (Kaigun-sho). On 5 February 1942, the Government promulgated the Imperial Ordinance relating to the special wartime case of jurisdiction with regard to the business of shipbuilding. This (a) limited the authority of the shipbuilding industry to regulate the supply and demand of important materials used for ships (i.e., set up a priority system); and (b) transferred to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Navy, for the duration of the war only, jurisdiction (hitherto in the hands of the Minister of Communications (Tsushin-sho)) over construction and repair of merchant vessels.

Besides insuring elasticity between materials for naval construction and materials for merchant ship construction, this change made a single system out of the two construction plans, and in general contrived to regulate both. This put the construction of naval and merchant vessels fundamentally on the same footing. For it was desirable that the question of the relative percentage of naval and merchant craft to be constructed should be governed by a unified plan, in accordance with the availability of materials, building facilities, and current requirement.

Only general schedules, however, were to be set by the Navy Ministry, while the allocation of orders and raw materials for specific yards were to be handled by the Industrial Equipment Management Corporation on the one hand, and by the Shipbuilding Control Association (Zosen Toseikai), on the other.

b. Industrial Equipment Management Corporation. Under the system of standard production and unified design which we have already described, ordering of ships by a single authority was inescapable, and the machinery that was set up to play the part of the single ordering authority was the Industrial Equipment Management Corporation. This National Policy Company took over the wartime standard-pattern ship program, on the basis of the government ship construction plans, and gave contracts to all the shipyards.

Aside from these activities, the corporation became the main instrument for financing Japanese shipbuilders and guaranteeing them against loss. In effect, it was at the same time a device for subsidizing the industry and for providing it with compensation in the case of loss, all at public expense.

According to the charter of this corporation, the necessary number of ships are to be assured as long as the country needs them. This the Government accomplishes, on the one hand, by making part of the cost of building new ships a direct national burden, and, on the other hand, by supplying floating capital for shipbuilding. By revising the ordinance concerning compensation of losses, the Government raised the limit of the floating capital it would supply from two-thirds to four-fifths of the capital value of any one shipyard. By lowering the sphere of application of these provisions it extends them to all ships classified as small wartime standard-pattern ships. It has also equalized compensation for loss of capital through its monetary organ, the Industrial Bank of Japan. (In connection with shipbuilding finances it is interesting to note that the Bank of Japan allegedly supplied ¥ 192,000,000 in 1942, in addition to the capital coming from other government agencies).

In the event that there ceases to be a national need for the finished ships and the corporation shall have occasion to sell them for private use, it has been decided that the Government shall pay compensation for losses incurred by the corporation and that the standard prices for constructing ships and for transferring them shall be decided by the Government.

The foregoing practices, besides establishing a financial policy, made the IEMC responsible for the positive expansion of shipbuilding through the application of two pivotal principles, namely, simplification of pattern and unitary construction -- one yard, one type. (See Appendix IV for additional details).

c. Shipbuilding Control Society. The Shipbuilding Control Society is the central body directing the control associations in this industry. (To the Society is appended a consultative association which includes the related industrial control associations). The Shipbuilding Control Society assists in handling the supply of materials under a priority system. Affiliated with the central Shipbuilding Control Society are five regional shipbuilding consultative associations made up of the medium and small scale manufacturers. The president of the society, which was established in 1942, is SHIBA Koshiro (formerly head of Mitsubishi Jukogyo), and the Managing Director is Vice Admiral (Reserve) KUWAHARA Shigeharu.

According to a semi-official Japanese source, the Shipbuilding Control Society has been described as one of the planning agencies for general advancement of national power which has been established in Tokyo in accordance with the Major Industries Association Ordinance of September 1941. Member organizations of this society are designated by the Navy Ministry (formerly by the Ministry of Communications) on the basis of the following requirements:

- (i) Any shipbuilding association which builds ships over 100 meters long or constructs engines for ships, or both, may be admitted as a member organization.
- (ii) Any shipbuilding proprietor who cannot meet the foregoing requirements is not to be admitted.
- (iii) Any proprietor who manufactures or repairs parts for ships of the required length as mentioned above may become a member.
- (iv) Exceptions to the above regulations may be made upon the approval of the Navy Ministry (formerly upon approval of Communications Ministry).

The principal aim of the control society is to construct and repair ships within the framework of national planning of the Japanese Government. In order to carry this program into effect the society has also to secure the necessary raw materials and apply expert technique. The leading personnel members of the Shipbuilding Control Society include the President of the Society, the Chairmen of the Board of Directors, several Directors, several Supervisors, and several Advisers. The President of the Society is appointed by the Navy Minister (formerly by the Communications Minister). The Chairman and Members of the Board of Directors are appointed by the President of the Society, but with the approval of the same Minister, who, as he sees fit, may order the dissolution of the Shipbuilding Control Society. The Society holds an annual meeting at its General Headquarters within two months following the end of each year. Provisional meetings may be called upon the suggestion of the President.

Each member organization is required to make reports to General Headquarters concerning its construction progress, the condition of ships which it is repairing, the nature of the furnishings of its ships, establishment of new branches or various changes, relating to the ships themselves, labor, capital, and planning. (See Appendix IVf for a list of members of the Shipbuilding Control Society).

d. Local Associations (Kumiai) in Wooden Shipbuilding. At the outbreak of war, Japan's wooden shipbuilding industry consisted of over 3,000 yards, most of them employing less than ten workers and building small vessels by traditional handicraft methods. To unify and expand them to an industry capable of building a cargo fleet of significant dimensions has meant a drastic reorganization of the industry.

The first step was the forced consolidation of these yards under centralized government control. The 3,000 yards were reduced by merger to 600 and these in turn organized into 41 local associations, or Kumiai (in all urban and rural prefectures). These wooden shipbuilding associations were further organized into one unit, the Japanese Federation of Wooden Shipbuilding Associations.

Quotas of wooden vessels designed according to standard specifications were then allotted to each firm by the Japanese Federation of Wooden Shipbuilding Associations (later merged in or affiliated with the Shipbuilding Control Society under the "New Economic Structure"), under the direct control of the Ministry of Communications (later probably under the Navy Ministry.) The Navy, which controls steel ship construction, was given supervisory power over the building of vessels under fifty meters, as well as the control over the supply of engines and fittings. Quotas of materials, machinery, tools, etc., were allotted under the national economic mobilization plans. Low-cost financing and bonuses for production afforded financial incentives.

Excerpts, pages IV-239; IV-252 - IV-257; IV-259 - IV-269.

聯合國文書八八〇

日記

字西國立反ビ情報局

國立反ビ文研課

國立反ビ文研第二五五八。四

日本ノ軍艦圖表

第四部

造船事業

記事

日本ノ造船事業ノ前史、日本國海軍反ビ政府機關ノ
歴史ヲ主トシテ取扱フ。亦其工農ノ能力反ビ工學的
部面ヲセシム。

一九四五年ノ昭和二十年ノ十月三十一日

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一九四四年ノ昭和十九年ノノ中頃迄ニ日本ノ商船反
ビ海軍船舶ノ損害ノタメ远洋船舶貿易復活シテノテ
日本ハ各地ニ艦隊レバ軍隊ノ船艦反ビ一九四三年ノ
昭和十八年ノノ工業生産ノ水準ヲ維持スルニ必要テ
原燃料ノ過量ニ必要ナリ。此ノ損失
ヲ埋合セルタメニハ一九四四年ノ昭和十九年ノニ於
テ少クトモ二百五十万噸トノ創テ商船ヲ建造シテ
ケレバナラヌコトナツカ。

日本ノ商船（一九四五年ノ昭和二十年ノ九月
五日）ニ依ツテ國内外ニサレバ最近ノ實字ハ日本力能

議院ニ於クテ公すレバ可助商船トノ貿 (一〇〇) 、
以上ハ五百二十万トノ余シスアカツハ日本モ
シテ居ル。

馬鹿者、算盤ヲ運営ビ遺失ニ因ハル議會ノ議定
第ニ度アル。

是れ、日本ハ議會ノ同僚又ビ日本ハ議會ノ議定、
是ノ事ヲ得シカズメニ少シク當日ニ當リテアハル
モ猶シナシ、猶ヘハ其ノ議會ノ中ニハ貿易トシテ
其議會中ノ議論ノトキ議會ニシテナリ。

四、通商手帳ヲ通じ

三國ノ通商政事の因縁

一九三一年ノ明治七年ノ貿易ノ通締

日本ノ通商手帳ノ制定連下議會トニ貿イテ
ノ儀ス、國ニテ通商ニ便ヘテ、如何ナカニ議會
造議工事方經濟的ナラズル事ニ當リテ後段
カア決定スル目的ヲ以テ我が方國會ニ至
ツ議事ニ於ケル通商手帳ノ經濟的方面
ヲ確保スルにト方必要テアハル。

一八六八年ノ明治元年ノノ議院以降、日本
國會ハ通商ノ問題ニ關心ノ注意ヲ第ヒ一八五
五年ノ明治二十八年ノノ中日ニ於ケル議會ノ
通商手帳、一八九六年ノ明治二十九年ノノ議
定ナシ、是等ニ關心有ル全ノ議員ニ於ケル之
ハ。

第一次世界大戦當時、（一九一九年）大正八年、一噸一万二千緸トノノ商船が日本より天皇御前ノ御詔書及景氣ノ賜勅ハ總務省ノ御内閣ノ御詔書也。然シソ、後改セアク道明文ノ御勅金ノ年額ペースト量年、大正八年ノ御詔書ニモ下ル傾向ヲ示シム。

一九二〇年後ノ間、運輸工事ハ運輸不況ノ入ソラ、一九二七年ノ昭和二年ノ年終ヲハ當初之額ハ四万二千緸トノ御詔書の總務省が、ソシテ運輸省レハ勅金ハ年に約一千萬圓ニ達シム。此ノ開港場ハ重慶運輸成金ヲ天保ツサリテハサク、國內ノ開港場の總務省の運輸金及支拂ハ運入税ノ免除ニヨリテ運送業者ヲ補助シタ。一九二九年ノ昭和四年ノ政務ハ運輸ノハニ、零星手荷物入貨當金ノ參テ總額ノ輸送額ヲ五千ヘ、三千万圓ノ貨物詔令を頒布シテ得ハシニテツム。然シツイテ超ツク世界的經濟不況ニヨリコノ御詔書シテ後ニ立テスツム。ソレハヲ體現テ當初方ハジメツタ。總務省詔令ハ一九三〇年代ノ初期ニ於テ底落、前編御運輸詔令ニヨリテ天保ノ促進シム。政府、官署ノ下ニ旨示メ眞旨ハ、當初ノ為タハソノ體ノ如也。ハサク、モ運輸セラ候運輸局詔令シタ、テアル

b 船舶及び造船計画、一九三〇年代ニ於ケル造船

一九三二年ノ昭和七年ノ日本政府ハ當大ナル決定ヲシテ即ち日本ノ國營隊ノ不測ナ信頼分離ヲ實現シテ是ヲ當初計画ノ國家ヲ以テスルベメニシテ即ちハノ國營隊を造船工事經中ノ第一ノ支那大陸建設ノメニハ昭和七年ノ昭和七年ノ支那大陸建設ノ第一回登録ハ、最初に造る船ノ港にて造りシル新船第一トシニツキ造船二十五年又ハソレ以上ノ船舶ノ二トシヲ層級トスルトイフ條件ノ下ニ、二十万総トンノ新船建造ハノ造ヲ開イタ。新船ハ各々四千総トン級ハソレ以上ニテ、少くトセ十三ノット半以上ノ速力ヲ出シ得、且ツ日本ノ造船所ヲ作ラルニシテ其ノ貿易シタ。

コノ計画ハ、昭和十七万総トン、九十四隻ノ造船ヲスクリップ化シ、昭二十二万総トンノ三十一隻ノ新船ノ建造ヲ見ハト云フ結果ヲ生シダ。

三十一隻ノ船舶ヲ建造スルニ要シ々巨費ハ五千五百萬圓弱ト見當ラレバ。政府ノ助成金ノ額額ハ一千二百元迄クナツカ。

ソレソレ一九三五年ノ昭和十年ノ一九三六年ノ昭和十一年ノニ創定サレタ第ニ、第三ノ

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計量ハ第一ノヨリハ小規模ノセノテアツ々。二着ヲ結合シタ結果ハ、十萬噸トノスクラップ化、約十萬噸ト、十七隻ノ船隻ノ建造トナリ、助成金ノ割合ハ、第一計量ノ際ノ半分強テアツ々。建造サレタ船隻ハ四千トン或ハソレ以上ノ噸トナリ有シ、且十五ノット以上ノ速力ヲ出スコトガ出来々。

(以下次頁)

卷之三

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二ハ、運賃ノ半バニセ、上ル福助金ノ割合テ、六〇〇
英國及義大利十九節ヲ下ラザル、即ち旅客並ニ貨物定期船
ノ運送ヲ導航シタ。一九三七年七月ノ官報ノ附録ニ、
客船一五万呉目及ビ、貨船一五万呉目ノ運送ノタメニ
ハ、次ノ四年間ニ亘ルハレハダラウ福助金ハ、十八年
ニ跨ル民鉄金ニヨツテ支給ハ、セノテアルハガト云フ
コトガ述べテアル。一九三七、三八年ニ始マル、十八ヶ
年間ニ亘ル本計額ニ、額計五千萬圓以上ノ支出が想示サ
レバ。ノ四頁ノ

第十八表ハ、一九一三年ヨリ一九三八年ニ至ル間ノ英
國定期ノ年ニ於ケル一〇〇以上ノ船舶ノ額表示
ス

十八表

江水開拓ノ統計 (上集)

年次	総面積	耕地面積
一九一三	一三二	六四、八六頃
一九一〇	一四〇	四三六、六四二
一九三〇	三七	一五二、二七二
一九三二	四四	三四、四二二
一九三四	一五五	一三二、三二〇
一九三六	一八〇	二九四、八六一
一九三七	一八〇	四五、二二一
一九三八	一四六	四三、七二〇

出典、日本ノ開拓一九四〇年 (日本農業年鑑)

一九三〇年代中頃ノ開拓ハ經濟上之秘密に關係ハ
遠ニ西ツテ居タ、然シ中上トノ以學易を會通にシテ
邊境ノハムカニ通スル貿易ガ經濟上之秘密カヲ皆カ
ノ小立派ニシテシタコトヲ正義反對シタ。一
九三九年五月示遠ニ公セラレク又之於中一六三
ノ公文ノ總數ハ八〇八、六七〇件アリタ。其
等ノ甲七、〇〇〇件以上ノ高額三四五之ノ總數ハ

三〇六、六〇〇 嶺テ六、〇〇〇 嶺以下ノモノ一三三
隻ノ総噸数ハ五〇二、〇七〇 嶺テアツタ。一九三八年十一月三十日、即テ六ヶ月以前ノ数字ニ比較シテ
前者級ノ船ハ復数ニ於テ二、嶺数ニ於テ二七、九三〇 嶺ノ級少ヲ示シタ。然シ後者級ノ船ハ隻数ニ於テ
八五、嶺数ニ於テ三二五、四二〇 嶺ノ增加ヲ示シタ。
第十九表ハ一九三二年ヨリ一九三八年ニ至ル間ノ一〇〇〇 嶺隻ノ造水船ヲ示ス。此處ニハ特別ナ事ハ
殆ド見ラレナイ

(一五二)

第十九表 (次頁)

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C、海軍建造。商船建造トノ比較

海軍艦船建造ハ六表（第二十表）ニ示サレル如ク、此ノ期間ニ勿論又力ヲ入レラレタ。商船ノ進水モ亦此表ニ載セテアハ、進水ノ數字ト並ニ等十九零ニ示シタ數字トノ間に少シ違ツク所ガアハコトニ氣ガ付クコトト恩フ。斯ノ如キ艦隊ハ大シタ意欲アルワケデナク、主トシテ異ル出典ノ資料ニ依ツクコトヲ反映シテ居ル。下ニ記載スルモノハ一九四〇年マテノモノテアル

第二十表

日本並ニ日本ノ統領下ニアル領土内ノ造船所テ
進水セル鋼鐵商船及ビ海軍艦船ノ總順數

	海軍艦船	商船
一九三四	一九四〇	（英）頓
一九四〇	一五七、五二〇	二〇八、〇一四
一九三九	一六六、七九〇	三四二、八八〇
一九三八	五三、八二二	四三八、八九〇
一九三七	五一、二五八	四八七、三五七

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一九三六 五三、三〇五 三〇五、八〇三
一九三五 三九、七六二 一四五、九〇一 註參照
一九三四 三八、二七四 一五四、八六〇 註參照

出典 クラスゴーヘラルド、第三易年鑑、一九三六年一九三七年一九三八年號

ロイド船級簿、ロンドン、一九四三年三月二受ケタル資料ニ

依り特ニ表二作り上テタモノ

ジョン、卓艦、一九四一年刊、オリエンタル、エコノミスト、(東京)一九三六年四月號

註、日本々土ノ建造高ノミヲ含ム。

二、政府ノ獎勵及管理諸法律

a、ヨーロッパ造船事業法、中國及歐洲戦争ハ日本ノ軍用船舶ノ大規模ナ増強ヲ必要トシタ。船舶ノ戦争ニ依ル損失ハ中立国船舶及世界船舶ノ減少ト共ニ之ヲ補填スルコトヲ必要テアツタ。日本ハ以後ノ造船ニ就イテハ大部分自己ノ能力ニ依存セバナラナカツタ。

コノ新タニ生起シタ情勢ニ對応スルタメ、日本ハ臨時船舶管理制度、造船事業法並ニ造船統制法ヲ初メ依頼ノ主要ナ船舶關係法律ヲ創定シタ。之等法律ノ内、最も重要なノハ造船事業法テソノ性質並ニ機能

ヲ詳述スルコトハ當ヲ張タモノト恩フ。本法ハ日本ノ半官道筋ガ次ノ様ニ説明シテキル。

1 一九三九年六月二十四議會通過
（1）本法ノ目的 一 本法ノ目的トスル所ハ國防上ノ見地カラ低價格ニヨル造船供給ヲ增大シ、十分ナル造船能力ノ維持ヲナスニアル。一九三九年六月二十四議會ヲ通過シタ本法ハ造船事業ノ政府ニヨル保護、統制ノ宿體ヲ規定シテイル。」

（2）政府管轄 一 本法ニ據り造船事業ハ監督ナル政府ノ管轄下ニ置カレル。新規企業ノ設立、合併及造船會社ノ事業ノ中止ハ政府ノ許可ヲ受クベキコトトナル。」

（3）造船業者ノ特權 一 乍併造船業者ハ土地收容權ヲ與ヘラレ又拂込料金ノ二倍迄ノ社債ヲ運行スルコトヲ許サレル。政府ハ未だ此上ニ於テ創造サレタコトノナイ船体、機械、及ビ儀表品ノ製作ニ關シ指示ヲ發シ得、且ソノ場合製金ヲ交付シ得ル。政府ハ又造船業者ニ船体、機械及儀表品ノ製作ニ當リ上蓋品ノ使用ヲ命ズルコトガ出來ル。政府ハ性能ノ規格ヲ定メコノ規格ニ適合シナイ製品ヲ不合格トスルコトガ出來ル。」

（4）政府助成金及損失補償金 一 造船事業振興上必

要ナ場合、政府ハ造船業者或ハ船舶所有者ニ助成金ヲ交付シケル。政府ハ公共ノ利益ノ爲造船業者ニ船舶、船体、機器及機器品ノ價格並ニ修繕料等ノ變更ヲ命ズルコトガ出來ル。政府ハ又公益上必要アリト認ムルトキハ該等ノ請願、申請又ハ改良、船舶、船体、機器及機器品之修繕、並ニ特許等項ノ研究施設ノ設立ヲ要求スルコトガ出來ル。政府ハ造船事業力之等命令ノ實施ニ當リ蒙ル損失ニ對シ補償金ヲ支拂フコトガ出來ル。」

(5) 強制的企業組合ヲ組織スル私利 一六法ハ又共同購入、資本ノ管理、共同ノ使用ニ供スル施設ノ設立、組合員ノ事業活動ノ範圍及共通ノ利益ノ爲ノ研究事業ヲ目的トシ造船業者方共同組合ヲ組織シ得ル如キ件事ヲ含ンテキル。政府ハ是等組合員ニ規定ニ從フコトヲ命ジ且組合外業者ヲ組合ニ加入セシメルコトガ出來ル。最後ニ政府ハ本事業ノ健全ナル發達ノ爲該組合私利ニ對シ何等力ノ事業ヲ行フベキコトヲ命ジ得ル。」

6. 基本的造船法規、斯ク一方ニ船舶、及び造船ニ關シ範例ヲ強化スルト共ニ他面日本ハ一九三九年貨物船建造ヲ獎勵スル爲貨物船ノ規格ヲ示ス六ツノ標準ヲ採用シタ。之ニヨリ顯タナ國家的造船政策方起

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り、ソレニ従ツテ多數ノ企圖ガ實行ニ移サレタ。

乍併一九四一年十二月七日ノ余波トシテ日本ノ造船ノ一層急進ナル趨勢ノ要求ガ起ツタ。コノ情勢ニ對應スル爲、一連ノ基本的、組織的造船法規ガ採用サレ一九四二年五月公布サレタ。是等法規ハ、造船業者ガ政府ノ企圖ニ従事、政府ノ強力ナル援助ヲ受ケテ一定ノ期間内ニ、要求ガ容認スルダケノ量ノ船舶ヲ建造セバナラタトイフ假定ノ下ニ作成サレタ。本計画實現ノ爲次ノ如キ技術的條件ガ肝要ト存ヘラレタ。

(1) 次元シタ標準型船舶建造ノ爲、船体、機器裝備及其外部分ノ一定ノ仕様書ヲ必要ナ圖面ト共ニ造船業者ニ供給スルコトアツタ。ソノ目的ハ船舶ノ大量生産ヲ容易ナラシムルコトニアツタ。之ハ要スルニ過去ニ於テ與ナツタ造船業者方々ノ考案、企圖及圖面ヲ呈出スル場合ニ生ジタ標準圖面ヲ來サシメス爲、企圖ヲ標準化スルコトアツタ。

(2) 非標準型船ノ在支ニ關シテハ客船建造ノ如キ特殊場合ヲ除キ一般ニ建造ヘ引キ受ケヌコトトナツタ。

(3) 各スヘテノ造船所ニ最高ノ能率ヲ發揮サセル爲各造船所ハ標準化計画ノ一定ノ段ノ船舶建造ヲ指

ニサレ、ソノ邊ノ船ヲ高門トスルコトニナツタ。
全計テ十九船アツテ次ノ通りアル。即チ貨船ハ
六艘、油船ハ三艘、鐵石輸送船ハ一隻、木
造船ハ五隻、木質船ハ四隻アル。是等ノ船
ハ次ノ如ク駆逐シテ、オル。

貨物船

A型	總屯数	六、三〇〇屯
F型	總屯数	四、四〇〇屯
C型	總屯数	一、二、七〇〇屯
D型	總屯数	一、九〇〇屯
E型	總屯数	八三〇屯
F型	總屯数	四九五屯

油船、總屯数、一〇、〇〇〇屯、五、〇〇〇屯、一、〇〇〇屯
鐵石輸送船、總屯数、五、五〇〇屯

上記船相ハ魚造船アル。之ヨリ小型ノ船ハ魚
不足ノ爲木造アル。是ハ既時標準型木造船ト稱サ
レアル。是ハ二種類ニ區分シ得ル。

木造貨船 總屯数二五〇屯、二〇〇屯、一五〇
屯、一〇〇屯、七〇屯
輕量木造船 總屯数、三〇〇屯、二〇〇屯、一
五〇屯、一〇〇屯

C. 真似、合理化着目

各造船業者方標準造船計畫ニ従ツテ行フ外ニ、
次ノ點方強調サシ。

(i) 造船用鋼材ニ鑄スル標準規格、(ii) 代用資材、
使用範囲ヲ極度ニ擴張スルコト、(iii) 船体機器及ビ
其備品ヲ簡化スルコト、(iv) 氣鎗接使用範囲ヲ
擴張スルコト、(v) 造船術ヲ改善シ以テ全般ニ亘リ資
材ヲ節約スルコト

三、監理

A、海軍省一九四二年二月五日政府ハ造船業ニ
スル權限ノ戰時特別取扱ニ對スル勅令ヲ發布シ
タ、コレハ造船用重要資材ノ需要供給ヲ調整ス
ル為造船業、權限ヲ制限シ（即チ優先權ヲ設定
シ又（五）戰時ニ限り國造ノ建造及ビ修理ニ「スル
一從來通信省ノ掌握シテキタ」權限ヲ海軍省ノ
權限ニ委譲スルコトアツメ。

コノ要項ハ建築資材ト、船舶建造用資材ト、固ニ
彈力性ヲ有タセタ外ニツク、建造計畫ヲ單一系ト
ナシ且ツ全般的ニ兩者ヲ調整シヨウト企テタモノ、

Aug 7. 1890

テアル、ソノタメニ、本船及ビ、兩船ノ建造ハ、根本
的ニ同一基礎ノ上ニ置カレルコトニナツタ、但シ
建造スペキニ、本之ニ兩船ノ比率、問題ハ、資材、
有無、建造費、船主、上面ノ要求ト睨ミ合セテ、
一元的企畫ニヨツテ、統制サレルコトガ望マシイ
カラテアツタ。

然シ、海軍省ノ決定スルノハ、一設計、ダケテア
ツテ、何ノ造船ニ登註シ且ツ、資材ヲ、制當テルカ
ハ、一方ニ於テ、產業設備、營國又地方ニ於テ、造船
統制會ノ掌ル所テアツタ。

B、產業設備、營國、上述ノ如ク、標準生産及ビ、一元
化設計ノ組織ニ於テハ、單一権威者ヨリ、建造命
令ヲ、發スルコトハ止ムシ、有ナイコトテアリ、而
シテコノ單一登註権威者ノ役ヲ、行使スルタメニ
設定サレタ機関ハ、產業設備、營國テアツタ、コノ
日算會社ハ、政府ノ造船計畫ニ基ク、即時規格船
建造ヲ、踏實シ、各造船所ト、契約ヲ行ツタ。

コレ等ノ仕事ノ外ニ、該管國ハ、日本ノ造船業者
ニ對スル金融及ビ、損失補償ノ、主タル機、トナツ
タ、石ハ、事實上該產業ヲ、補助スルト共ニ、損失ノ

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場合ニハ凡テ政府ノ負擔ニ於テ補償ヲ行フ機会
テアツス。

コノ營業ノ規定ニ依レバ國家ガ船舶ヲ必要ト
スル限り其所長領ヲ引受クベキコトニナツテキ
ル政府ハ一方ニ於テ新造延造費ノ一部ヲ直接國
庫負擔トナシ又他方ニ於テ建造用流动資金ヲ供
給スルコトニ依リ、コレヲ達成セントスルノテ
アル。政府ハ損失補償ニスル勅令ヲ改正シ、
供給シ得ル流动資金ノ限度ヲ各造船所ノ資本金
ノ三分ノ二ヨリ五分ノ四ニ引上げタコレ等ノ規
定ノ適用範囲ヲ引下ケ、政府ハ小型駆逐艦規格船
トシテ分類サレテキル凡ノ船舶ニモコレヲ適用
シタ、又資本ノ損失ニ對シテハソノ金融機関タ
ル日本興業銀行ヲ通シ補償ヲ均分シタ、(建造
資金ノ金融ニ當通シ他ノ政府代理者ニヨリ融通
サレタる資金ノ例ニ一九四二年中日本銀行方融
資シタト云ハル、金額万一千九百二十萬圓ニ上
ツタコトハ異味アル點テアル。)

竣工セル船舶ニ對シテ國家ガ不用トナリ而シテ
營団ガ民間用トシテ拂下ケル場合ニハ、營団ノ
蒙リタル損失ニ對シテハ政府ガ補償ヲ行ヒ而シ

テ標準運送價格及比
下
標準スルヤウニ取扱メテアツ々。

臨着方針ヲ確立スル一方上述ノ指置ニ依リ、
卷口ハ、ニツノ達本原則、即チ船型ノ簡素化及
ビ一造船業主等ノ採用ヲ通じ造船業ノ精良的擴
大ニ對スル責任ヲ負担スルコト、ナツ々、(尙
詳編ハ附錄第四四参照)

○造船統制會、造船統制會ハコノ工業ニ於ケ
ル統制會ヲ指揮スル中央機関テアカルコノ會
ニハ附屬トシテ、係直隸統制會ノ包含スル諭問
書會方存在スル、造船統制會ハ重點主義ニ則リ
資材ヲ供給スル事務ヲ援助スル、中央ノ造船統
制會ニ加盟シ居ルモノニ中小業者ヨリ組織サレ
タ。其城別造船諭問會方立ツ存在スル、コノ統
制會ハ一九四二年ニ設立セラレ、會長ハ斯波孝
四郎(前三澤重工業會長)、常務理事ハ(眞備役)
海軍中將桑原宣治テアル。

日本側ノ半官消息通ノ傳フル所ニ依レバ造船
統制會ハ、一九四一年九月頃布ノ重要產業國體
令ニ従ツテ東京ニ設立セレタ國力増進ニ對スル
企畫機関ノニツテアカルトイフコノ會ノ會員ハ次
ノ條件ニ達イテ海軍省(以前ニハ通信省)ニ依
リ指名サレバ。

(1) 長サ一〇〇米以上ノ船ヲ建造シ又ハ船用機器ヲ
建造シ又ハ兩者ヲ建造スル造船倉社ハ會員トシ
テ入倉シ得ルコト。

(2) 上記ノ要件ヲ具ヘテイ造船事業主ハ入倉ヲ許サ
レナイ

(3) 前項規定ノ長サノ船舶ニ對スル部分品ヲ製造又
ハ修造スル事業主ハ會員トシテ入倉スルコトガ
出來ル

(4) 上記規定ニ對スル例外ハ海事省（以前ニハ通信
省）ノ許可ヲ得テ作ルコトガ出來ル。

該倉庫、主ムル目的ハ日本政府ノ國家計画ノ
管内ニテ船舶ヲ建造修理スルコトニアル。此ノ
計画ヲ實施スルタメニ該倉庫ハ又必要ナル原材
料ヲ確保シ且ツ熟練技術ヲ充用スルノ要ガアル
造船統制倉ノ重要職員ニハ倉長、理事長、若干
ノ理事、若干ノ監督及ビ若干ノ顧問ガアル。倉
長ハ海事大臣（從前ハ遞信大臣）ガ之ヲ任命ス
ル。理事長及ビ各倉長ガ之ヲ任命スルガ、ソノ
際大臣ノ承認ヲ必要トスル。同大臣ハ適當ト

記メル時ハ造船統倉會、解散ヲ命ズルコト方出来ルノテア。統倉會ハ毎年度終了後二ヶ月以内ニソノ帳本部ニ於テ年次倉合ヲ開催スル。臨時倉合ハ倉長ノ建議ニヨリ招集シ得ル。倉員々ノ各種職務ハ、建造ノ進捗度修理中ノ船舶ノ情況ソノ船舶ノ設備ノ性質支所、新設或ハ其ノ他造船モノ、労働、資本、計算等ニ關する種々ナ事項ニ就キ、總本部ニ報告ヲ爲ス更方アリ。〔造船統倉會員名簿ニ就テハ附錄区之参照〕

D 木造船建造ニ於ケル地方聯合体（組合）
設立ノ勃興當時日本ノ木造船建造工業ハ三千以上ノ造船所ヨリ構成サレテ居リ其ノ大部分ハ雇傭労働者十名以下テ舊來ノ手工業的方法ニヨリ小船舶ヲ建造シテ居ルモノテアツタ。之等ヲ統合擴張シテ有用ナ大サヲ有スル貨物船體ヲ建造シ得ル工業ヲランメルニハ此ノ工業ノ強力ナ發展ヲ必至トシタ。

其ノ第一段階ハ政府ノ一元的統制ノ下ニ之等造船所ヲ強制的ニ組合スルコトアツタ。三千ノ造船所ハ合同ニ依リ六百ニ減シ、之亦四十一

ノ地方聯合春田チ組合（社テ）ノ都市堅・農村堅
ヲ運ジテ一ニ組合セレタ。之等木造造船組合ハ更
ニ單一ノ日本木造造船組合聯合會ニ組合セレタ。

次テ日本木造船組合聯合會（後ニ「一億新
倅創」ノ下ニ造船統制會ニ合同又ハ参加シタ）
ガ、福島省（後ニハ悉ラク福島省ノ直轄ノ統
制下ニ、各會社ニ標準仕様書ニ従ツテ設計セレ
タ木造船ノソノ經營スペキ分ヲ經營テタ。鋼船
建造ノ範例ニ當ル者ニハ三十米以下ノ船舶ノ建
造ニモ、機上ヤ機械部品ノ供給ト同様、之ニ對
スル點行徳ヲ與ヘラレテキタ。原材料、機械類
工具類等ハ國家經濟動員計算ノ下ニ御當行行ハ
レルコトニナツテキタ。低利ノ資金供給ト生產
費資金トハ金融面ヨリ創設ヲ與ヘタ。

抜　　導　　IV 二三九・IV 二五二

IV 二三七　　IV 二三九　　IV 二六九